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I.
Whenever the economic-social contents of social ownership and of pro­
prietary rights to be exercised by socialist economic organisations are to be 
analysed, whenever the organisational-legal forms of these rights are to be 
framed, an approach to these questions from the angle of political, state- 
administrative, financial and civil law presents itself as a scientific task of 
great imjiortance. V et it is a question at least of the same importance how 
the collectives of employees can participate -  directly, or through trade unions 
and other social organisations — in the exercise of proprietary rights deleg­
ated to employer enterprises; or, more exactly and in more detail: what 
rights of participation are due to them on the enterprise level, and on higher 
levels, in planning, directing and controlling the activities of enterprises. 
Another important question is in what ways, through what legal forms, the 
employees’ collectives and their members can have a share in the national 
income, i.e. in enterprise profits.
To clarify all these questions, the discipline of labour law takes over the 
relay baton from the disciplines of political, administrative, financial and 
civil law at the door of the enterprise, so to speak; and it is principally con­
cerned with studying how the internal economic-social substratum of a social­
ist employer enterprise, the corresponding enterprisal structure, the organi­
sational-legal status of collectives and their members, are shaped in respect to 
the aforesaid questions. *
The answers science gives to these questions necessarily follow the deve­
lopment of the mechanism of the economic-social system, of social ownership, 
the development of relations between the state and its enterprises, and the 
development of the enterprises proper. So it would seem reasonable to give 
-  if only in brief -  an outline of this development, which has taken place in 
the substratum and structure of state enterprises in connection with the 
economic reform, and in the views held about these questions.
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II.
1. Prior to the introduction of the economic reform in Hungary, a vir­
tually dominant view has emerged in Hungarian literature according to which 
the enterprises are not owners of the assets whose management had been 
entrusted to them, because the owner is solely and exclusively the state in 
every case.
This notion about the essence of state enterprises was in conformity with 
social reality during a certain period of our development. Yet development 
that has taken ¡dace since, and especially the introduction of the economic 
reform, called for some amplification of this conception in two respects. On 
the one hand, the state’s proprietorship can no longer be isolated so sharply 
from society, from enterprises; it cannot be regarded as exclusive to such an 
absolute extent, because the rise and development of socialist democracy, 
and — recently — the economic reform have made it possible and also neces­
sary, that the citizens, i.e. society, take a larger part in public and proprietary 
administration exercised by the state, as a result of which state property is 
becoming increasingly and actually property of the whole population. On the 
other hand, enterprisal independence is growing, and so is workshop demo­
cracy, as a result of which the employees’ collectives participate more and more 
intensely — under legally regulated organisational conditions — in the plan­
ning, organisation, direction and control of state enterprise activities, and, 
consequently, also in the exercise of proprietary rights due to the enterprises. 
Hence “state” enterprises are turned gradually also into “social” enterprises.
So the image formed about the economic-social contents and structure of 
state enterprises must be completed; on the one hand, with the relationships 
existing between the state and society, on the other hand with the relationships 
that exist between the state and the social facet of a state-owned enterprise, 
or we may as well say, between its organisational form and economic-social 
contents. The authors of the textbook “Hungarian Civil Law” enriched this 
concept some time ago. I t was extended by Miklos Vikighy “upwards”,toward 
society; Gyula Eorsi extended it “upwards”, “sideways” and “downwards” 
alike.
In his treatise “The People’s Economy, Political Science and Jurispru­
dence” Miklos Vikighy says that “at the present stage of socialist development, 
i. e. in circumstances where production goes on as organised by the state, with 
means of production owned by the state, the proprietorship of the employed 
person is materialised through his status as a citizen. The employed person is 
owner because, and in so far as, his status as a citizen permits him to have his say 
in the exercise of public executive power.”1
Gyula Eôrsi made an approach to the social facet of state enterprises 
through appreciating state property, enterprisal assets, and especially the intern­
al conditions emerging within the collective, and elaborated the pertinent view 
in this way.2
It was essentially to this point that views had developed in Hungary when 
in January 1968 the economic reform was introduced in this country too 
which has brought about changes in the relationship of the state and its enter­
prises. One substantial feature of these changes is that the independence of 
state enterprises has grown considerably in the field of management, and that
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also workshop democracy has continued to develop as a result. In view of this 
fact the problem of state ownership, of state enterprises as juristic persons, 
and the problem of the relationship between state and its enterprises were 
subjected to analysis in socialist countries including Hungary, once more.
We cannot undertake here to give a detailed description of this highly im­
portant polemic which is still going on; Gyula Eorsi has given one in his critical 
analysis concluding that uniform state ownership continues as a fundamental 
phenomenon of continuity within changes, no matter what substantial modi­
fications have been introduced.3
As will be seen from our further argumentation, wo, too, accept Eorsi’s 
view, although we approach the problem from a different angle. Namely what is 
of interest in connection with our theme is to clarify how people in general, as 
citizens of the state, on the all-social level, and employees in particular, as memb­
ers of enterprisal collectives, can take part in the exercise of proprietary rights 
relating to the instruments of production, to enterprisal assets. While the 
holders of the views that emerged in the aforesaid polemic were principally 
interested in the situation which develops between the state and its enterprises 
in respect to proprietary rights, we are interested in the other, not less important 
facet of all this. We are going to investigate what relationship exists in respect 
to employers’ and employees’ rights and obligations between state ownership 
and the proprietary rights to be exercised by the enterprises on the one hand, 
and between enterprises as juristic persons and enterprisal collectives and their 
members on the other hand. And we must carry out this analysis all the more 
so since an adequate concept of state ownership and of the entire complex of 
state enterprises, and, moreover, a complete and true picture of labour contracts 
and labour relations, cannot be formed if these questions are not clarified.
2. In our judgment the introduction of the economic reform, the develop­
ment of socialist democracy, and especially of workshop democracy within 
economic units, call for a further development of our views on state ownership 
and state enterprises, and for drawing the appropriate theoretical and practical 
conclusions. In an earlier study we have explained in detail that state-social 
ownership emerges as a joint ownership of a novel type; that it is not a configur­
ation of joint ownership under capitalist or socialist civil law, simply elevated to 
the all-social level, but is an all-social joint ownership of novel type.4 As con­
cerns the “legal” form of proprietorship, this joint ownership is characterized by 
the community feature on the one hand, and by the feature of indivisibility on 
the other, which means that social property and its legal form: state-social 
proprietorship cannot be divided into “proprietary” shares among the part- 
owners, i. e. the citizens, and not even among the enterprises. A fundamental 
question presents itself here: in what ways, in what legal forms, can the citizen’s 
status as a part-owner be maintained despite this fact, but with regard to this 
fact at the same time; how can the enterprise exercise proprietary rights, how 
can enterprisal collectives participate in the exercise of proprietary rights ? A 
correct answer to these questions can only be given if we realise that social 
joint ownership is manifest not only in the form of ownership under socialist 
civil law, but that it manifeststs itself within the scope of numerous other legal 
forms, interweaving and embracing the economic, social and legal system of 
society as a whole. Namely what is basically characteristic of this joint owner­
ship in view of its social purpose is the fact that for the citizens it ensures the
P A R T IC IP A T IO N  O F  E M P L O Y E E S  149
11*
assertion of their status as part-owners, because it enables them, within legally 
regulated forms,
a) to join their working ability with the instruments of production in 
social ownership: this is the right to work;
b) to have a share of the national income: this is the right to socialist 
distribution;
c) to participate in the public and proprietary administration of the 
socialist state, in enterprisal management: this is the right to participate in 
management.
3. This considerably simplified scheme, however, is working within most 
intricate organisational-legal forms; essentially, it operates on a tripartite 
level interconnected by a number of links: on the all-social level, on the enter­
prisal level, and on the level of citizens, i. e. the employed population.
a) On the all-social level, the state exercises the proprietary rights of 
social joint ownership in the interest, and as the representative, of the whole 
society; first of all, through the agencies of state administration. But the 
exercise of these all-social proprietary rights by these agencies is not in dis­
regard of the citizen. Citizens and their various social organisations are increas­
ingly drawn into attending to proprietary administrative functions, not only 
on the basis of our representative system, but also within the scope of various 
forms of socialist democracy developing at a growing pace. To exercise his 
rights as a part-owner on the all-social level is ensured to the citizen and his 
social organisations by subjective rights defined in the Constitution and other 
provisions of law, and by other institutionalised possibilities of socialist de­
mocracy on the basis of which the citizen can exercise influence on the state’s 
proprietary activities, i.e. on how the state should have disposal of the means 
of production on the highest level, how it should distribute the national in­
come. From all this it follows that the transformation of proletarian dictator­
ship into an all-popular state, the full development of the public character of 
social joint ownership, and the full development of the partownership status on 
the all-social level, are mutually conditional on one another, and mutually 
consolidate one another.
b) What correlation exists between state-popular property, its administ­
ration, on the one hand, and the state enterprises on the other? How is the 
status of citizens as part-owners maintained within the framework of state 
enterprises ?
The state — and this is very important — exercises its proprietary func­
tions, its partial rights included in ownership, not solely through the organs 
of executive power and state administration. Namely the exercise of some of 
these must be ceded to the economic organisations. First of all, because, parti­
cularly since the introduction of the economic reform, the organs of executive 
power and administration would not be able to take all the dispositions necessary 
for the possession, use and cii’culation of commodities. To put in another way, 
they are not able to perform the direct tasks of production and distribution; 
they are only able to plan, organise, direct and control production and distribu­
tion on the all social level. The possibility to exercise partial proprietary rights 
had to be ceded in a defined sphere also because a special type of commodity 
production is going on, in the circumstances of the economic reform, by making 
use of the law of value;5 state enterprises can be properly managed, and can take
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part in the circulation of commodities only if rights of possession, use and 
disposal are granted to them — although not in the sense of capitalist civil law, 
but according to the rules of the socialist legal system — in respect to the enter- 
prisal assets made available to them. But we consider it at least as important 
that the members of enterprisal collectives can exercise their rights as part- 
owners, especially their right to participate in management, only if the enter­
prises are given the legal possibility to exercise proprietary rights — i. e. the 
rights of possession, use and disposal — in respect to the assets made available 
to them; this is the organised basis on which the citizens, as members of enter­
prisal collectives, can maintain their status as part-owners directly in the 
field of production through taking part in the management of the enterprise. 
This was the case — within a narrower scope — also before the introduction of 
the economic reform. The substantial change is that as a result of the reform the 
independence of state enterprises has grown in their relations with organs of 
state administration; they have been authorised by the state to exercise the 
rights of possession, use and disposal independently in a substantially broader 
field. This developmental process has also affected intensely the gradual develop­
ment and enrichment of the material contents and legal form of labour relations. 
Namely, the legal relation of employment assumes a socialistic character 
already from the right to socialist work and socialist remuneration; moreover, 
the socialistic nature of employment begins to take shape with the fact that the 
employee joins his working ability with means of production owned by the 
state. The possibility to take part in the management of enterprisal activities 
was given to employees as the members of the enterprise collective already 
after the victory of the socialist revolution. But the rate of further growth and 
development was determined by the extent to which the relative independence 
of state enterprises was increased; it was this measure of independence that 
determined the growth of workshop democracy, i.e. the right of the enterprise 
collective, of the employees as members of the collective, to participate in the 
regulation, planning, organisation, direction and control of enterprisal activ­
ities. Consequently, the broader the independence of an enterprise, the more 
powerfully can the status of partial ownership be asserted and make felt its 
favourable individual and social effects. Rights of a collective nature, due to 
collectives, may also be established; these offer the possibility to the members 
of collectives to take part in those administrative activities of state enterprises 
which the latter are entitled to on the basis of rights of possession, use and 
disposal delegated to them by the state.
c) If we finally examine what kind of relationship exists between the 
employees’ personal, subjective rights under labour law and the partial pro­
prietary rights, it is easy to see that the employees’ novel, personal subjective 
rights, developing in the circumstances of socialism, are closely connected with 
their very status as part-owners, such as their right to work, to being employed, 
to adequate organisational and technological conditions, to guidance and 
information as may be necessary, etc.
What is therefore characteristic of the employee’s status within his employ­
er enterprise in socialism is the fact that his relations with the employer are 
essentially made up of three interconnected relationships: participation in the 
work of society, a share of the national income, and participation in the plan-
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mug, organisation, direction and control of enterprisal activities, precisely as 
the manifestation of his status as part-owner.
This has brought us to the realisation of the economic-social substance of 
socialist labour relations. Hence the legal regulation of labour contracts and 
employment as legal forms is determined by this economic-social content. This 
is sometimes concealed on the surface by the circumstance that labour law 
defines employment as a relationship existing between employer enterprise 
and employee. Yet the contents and nature of regulation are fundamentally 
determined by the aforesaid three relationships. Some socialist codes have 
already made explicit reference to this economic-social content behind legal 
regulations.0
As a consequence of all this, the right to work is present in the circum­
stances of socialism as one of the most important personal rights; its enforce­
ment, protection and promotion are served by several means of the socialist 
economic-social and legal system. The part-owner’s right to have a share of the 
national income is manifest under labour law as the right to wages, premiums, 
profit-shares, etc. The part-owner’s right to participate in enterprisal manage­
ment is legally manifest — within the framework of a state enterprise at least 
— in that the members of the enterprise collective can take part, through 
various organisational-legal forms of workshop democracy, in ways defined by 
provisions of law, in the planning, organisation, direction and control of the 
activities of the economic organisation. Hence their status as part-owners is 
manifest also in that they are entitled to take part — within limits set by pro­
visions of law — in the exercise of proprietary rights delegated to the employer 
enter] wise.
4. As concerns the structure of state enterprises, we only wish to discuss the 
principal questions, such as the state enterprise as an economic-social, organisa­
tional and legal unit; the special legal status of the manager; enterprisal inde­
pendence; the very important correlations between workshop democracy and 
the internal conditions of trade unions; and developmental trends connected 
with all this.
Socialist economic units are basically characterised by features which are 
not the formal opposites of those typical of capitalist economic organisations; 
they are altogether new features.
It was mainly under the influence of the XXth Congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party that socialist democracy in general, and workshop democracy 
in particular, began to grow and flourish. This was manifest in the broadening 
of trade union authority, in the formation of internal organisational patterns 
(works councils, production conferences, labour-dispute committees within 
works, workshop courts, etc.) on the basis of which the status of employees as 
part-owners was manifest not only in their right to work, and the socialist 
manner of sharing the national income, but also in that the employees could 
take part in enterprisal management. Hence a socialist employer enterprise is a 
new phenomenon characteristic of socialism; it is novel not only as concerns its 
economic-social content, but also in respect to its legal form.
In this connection we might emphasize first of all that within the frame­
work of a socialist enterprise we do not find any antagonistic difference between 
the owner of the means of production and the employees. As concerns the basic 
relationship to the means of production, each member of the collective is in the
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same position as follows from his status as part-owner. The only difference 
between them appears in the particular job they hold in the hierarchic order 
of the enterprise in accordance with rules of organisation and operation. This is 
so because — as we have shown — the socialist state-owned enterprise stands 
on the basis of socialistic joint ownership; both from the sociological and legal 
poi nt of view it forms a unit, a unit consisting of the assets made available to it, 
of pertinent rights and obligations, and of the collective of the employees, the 
collective rights due to the collective of the employees. Thus — as opposed to 
the structure of capitalist enterprises — the employees are no longer outside 
the framework of this structure, they are kept within it. The same applies to 
trade unions as the bodies protecting the employees’ interests, and to various 
organs operating under their guidance, such as workshop courts, production 
conferences, etc.
In the second place we may point out that the legally relevant activities of 
the aforesaid bodies do not result in any restriction from outside of proprietary 
and employers’ rights, they rather realise the participation in their exercise. 
This means, in more detail, that the entire collective of employees, co-operating 
with the manager, take part in these activities, exercising their pertinent rights 
in part directly, and in part indirectly, through the trade union and other 
internal organs. W ithin the sphere of workshop democracy, the proprietary 
rights ceded to the enterprise are exercised, and the tasks of work are attended 
to, by the same persons, i. e. by the members of the collective, each of them 
having his particular function in these respects as assigned to him by the rules 
of organisation and operation.
To conclude our considerations in this field, we mention that on the basis 
of the ideas we have set forth the position of the citizen as it emerges within the 
framework of the economic unit, is not solely a relationship of work and distri­
bution (remuneration), neither from the sociological, nor from the legal point of 
view; it is an organisational relationship of participation in the planning, organi­
sation, direction and control of enterprisal activities, and within this scope, a 
relationship of participation in the exercise of proprietary rights delegated to 
the enterprise, these relationships being based on the status as part-owner.
5. If, in connection with the assets of state enterprises, we start from the 
concept of social joint ownership, we may reach the conclusion that the state — 
its executive and administrative organs — representing the organisation of 
society as a whole, and having to perform tasks of disposal over means of 
production, and of directing management, must meet an obligation towards 
society; and that this obligation consists in coupling the working ability of 
society with the means of production in order to satisfy society’s material and 
cultural needs; it further follows from this that the organs of the state are 
bound by economic-social laws, and are also under a politico-legal obligation, 
to establish state enterprises for attending to social tasks. This entails the 
further obligation for the state to make available to enterprises the fixed and 
current assets required for the successful performance of their proper activ­
ities, to ensure them the conditions of possession, use and disposal. Rights due 
to state enterprises in this respect are the most important entitlements in the 
enterprise-state relationship; and they are among the most important elements 
of the economic-social contents of the state-enterprise construction at the 
same time.
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If, therefore, we consider a state enterprise not only as a legal form, but 
also as social reality, no state enterprise is conceivable without the personal 
factors — i.e. the collective of its employees — nor without being supplied 
with fixed and current assets.
Hence a state enterprise — as far as its economic-social contents are 
concerned — is the unit of the employees’ collective and the assets put at its 
disposal.
Yet we must not restrict the sphere of enterprisal activity and independ­
ence to the possession, use and disposal of enterprisal assets, for this would 
be nothing else but another narrowed-down view. The activities and independ­
ence of an enterprise do not consist merely in an independent management 
of the assets put at its disposal. A very wide sphere of activities is displayed 
within the scope of independence, connected, for instance, with management, 
production, regulation and organisation of working conditions, with the remu­
neration of employees, including personnel policy, professional training, and 
extension training. Promotion of welfare, of cultural, sporting, etc. activities, 
is also important for the employees. Enterprise collectives, usually through 
their trade unions, today take part in the organisation and administration of 
all these activities.
6. The manager as the top executive organ of the enterprise, with his 
special powers, obligations and responsibilities of one-man leadership, holds 
a special position at the head of the enterprise, and within its structure and 
collective at the same time.
According to new regulations framed upon the introduction of the eco­
nomic reform, state enterprises continue to be headed by a manager (Civil 
Code, Section 34), who takes decisions independently and under personal 
responsibility, within the compass of provisions of law, in matters concerning 
the enterprise.
The new provisions of law place considerable emphasis on the importance 
of the collective, and on trade union authority. I t has been provided that in 
attending to his tasks the manager must rely on the community of employees. 
The community of the employees is represented within the enterprise by the 
local organ of the trade union. The manager is under the obligation to respect 
the trade union’s authority of interest protection, and to co-operate with the 
local trade union organ. The rights due to trade union organs in the manage­
ment of enterprises are defined in the Code of Labour and in other provisions 
of law.
Pursuant to pertinent provisions of law, the manager is responsible for 
holding production conferences.
Highly important in respect to workshop democracy is the provision 
according to which the opinion of the trade union must be obtained for jud­
ging the work of the manager and his deputies (deputy).
It is also provided by law that the employer’s rights in respect to the 
manager’s employment are exercised by the foundation organ.7
The first conspicuous feature is that the directive organ not only appoints 
the manager, but also exercises all other “employer’s” rights, since there is no 
such oi-gan within the enterprisal structure as would be entitled to exercise em­
ployers’ rights towards the manager. So it is the state, as the proprietary or-
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ganisation «f the highest level, that exercises the employer's rights in respect 
to managers.
We reach the same conclusion if we examine the manager’s status from 
the angle of the employer’s obligations. Unlike in respect to the other employees, 
it is again the directive organ that must meet the “employer’s” obligations 
toward the manager, i.e. must provide the conditions required for performing 
the managerial tasks.
And if we analyse the manager’s rights and obligations as an employed 
person, the duality, the Janus-faoe, of the manager’s legal status becomes 
wholly and completely obvious.
Formulated in general terms, the manager’s basic duty is to ensure by 
his directive, organising and controlling activity, the proper, planned, and 
economical operation of the economic unit he is heading. And if we scrutinize 
this duty in more detail, it appears that this duty in the general sense, and 
the specific tasks arising from it, constitute the object and the content of a 
legal relation in a dual sense:
a) On the one hand, the manager must perform these duties on the basis 
of his legal relation with the state, as the “employee’s” obligations toward the 
state. \  et the same tasks, in the same connection, appear as the ’’employee’s” 
rights as well in the sphere of enterprisal and managerial independence, because 
the manager is vested alsóin his relation to the state with powers on the basis 
of which lie can perform his directive, organising and controlling activities 
towards the collective and its members independently, but within the compass 
of the law.
h) I ’lie manager is in a legal relation with the state as the directive organ, 
but is the leader, the top executive organ of the enter]irise at the same time. 
From this it follows, too, that he is entitled to exercise rights and to meet obli­
gations that are due to, and fall upon, the enterprise as an employer; it is the 
manager who is entitled and obliged to do so in the name, and on behalf of the 
enterprise, in relation to the collective and its members, at least on the top 
level of direction, organisation and control.
Hence the legal status of the manager cannot be interpreted as being 
restricted to a legal relation existing solely with the directive organ, or with 
the collective of the enterprise and its members, the peculiar situation, which 
is typical of state enterprises as a rule, is reflected in his legal status in both 
relations. The socialist enterprise is independent in its relation to the state 
within the sphere defined by provisions of law, but must exercise its rights 
and meet its obligations in such a way that its activities be successful, conform 
to the provisions of law, and, in the last analysis, to the interests of society. 
From all this we may draw the conclusion that the actions and attitudes 
which -  connected and disconnected -  play an itermediate part between 
central direction, the state enterprise as a juristic person, and the collective 
and its members, meet organisationally and legally in the rights and obli­
gations which belong to the independent activity sphere of the state eetcrpri.se ; 
and that they meet on the personal plane in the manager’s rights and obli­
gations.
7. A capitalist enterprise as an economic-social phenomenon is inevitably 
divided into two spheres without being a legal unit. One sphere comprises the 
owner with his proprietary and employer’s rights ; the other sphere the emplo-
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yees with their rights and obligations as employees. Within a socialist econom­
ic unit the part-owner and employee status is not separated, at least not in 
the sense that only a certain group of persons enjoys proprietary and employer’s 
rights, while another group of persons have only rights and obligations as 
employees. Namely a socialist state enterprise forms a unit — from the eco­
nomic-social and legal point of view alike — which comprises also the employees, 
the members of the collective; and in respect to the means of production, to 
the tasks of the enterprise, and to the goods produced, the employees are 
basically in an economic-social and political situation of the same content and 
nature. I t follows from this that very substantial rights are due to the collect­
ive — through their trade union — in respect to the planning, organisation, 
direction and control of enterprisal activities; within the framework of state 
enterprises, no separate owner exists as the subject of proprietary and emloyer’s 
rights and obligations. In the field of enterprisal management the state enter­
prise as a juristic person is the subject of all proprietary and employer’s rights 
and obligations delegated by the state for exercising; hence these rights and 
obligations must be distributed in someway among the manager, leading and 
other employees, the trade union committee, and the internal bodies operating 
under its guidance.
It therefore follows from the nature and structure of a socialist state enter­
prise that the whole internal organisational pattern of the economic unit, the 
authority of the various internal bodies, the rules of the operation and co­
operation of all these, must be defined by provisions of law and by statutes of 
organisation and operation.
Other rules define the rights due to the production conferences, the works 
committee dealing with labour disputes, the workshop court, etc. in connection 
with the organisation of the internal activities of the state enterprise.
The authority of the trade union is closely connected with these questions; 
this will be discussed in more detail later. Provisions of law and trade union 
statutes define the rights due to trade unions in the direction, organisation 
and supervision of the internal activities of state enterprise; on the other hand, 
they define the trade union rights -  based on the internal conditions of the 
trade union -  which are due to the employees to enable them to take part — 
through the trade union -  in the direction, organisation and control of the 
activities of the state enterprise, including the organisation in a broad sense 
of individual employment relations, even the regulation of such relations with­
in limits defined by provisions of law.
Thus the legal statusof each member of the working collective also includ­
es an organisational relation as a matter of necessity; this defines the employee’s 
legal status within the enterprise’s internal organisational and functional order, 
his rights and obligations in this respect. It defines the rights due to the emplo­
yees individually -  and on the basis of their organisational relations with the 
aforesaid bodies, and through them -  for exerting influence on the operations 
of the enterprise. Hence the member of the collective not only exercises his 
right to work, not only gets his share from the national income, he also is in 
an organisational relation in accordance with the organisational and functional 
order of the enterprise, has a share in enterprisal independence both materially 
and legally.8
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8. Let us consider in brief also the question of the development of the 
social facet. When we analyse the structure of a state enterprise, we must 
attach much more importance to the social aspect, i.e. how the members of 
the collective take part — directly, and indirectly through the trade union 
and various internal bodies — in the management of enterprisal operations.
Legal attitude and practice still are inclined to regard the participative 
and organisational rights due to the members of the collective, and especially 
the trade union, as something external, something which interferes quasi 
from outside with the manager’s authority activity, with the exercise of his 
rights and discharge of his obligations. Yet in reality the tendency of develop­
ment appears to be quite different, and in fact, it must be different. The organ­
isational framework of the economic unit is filled up by the collective of the 
employees. The employees’ collective in the state enterprise represents that 
social, human content of which the structure of the enterprise is only the form, 
the legal framework. In our opinion the internal bodies under the direction of 
the trade union, including the trade union committee, belong to the structure 
quite as much as the manager, or the organisational and functional order of 
the enterprise. Moreover, in this respect the external and internal organisa­
tional relations of the trade unions in part also belong to the structure of the 
state enterprise, in so far as it is these relations that determine how the emplo­
yees can influence the activities of the trade unions — of the internal bodies 
directed by them — and, through this, the activities of the enterprise. Various 
social organisations, together with the organs of the state belong to the struc­
ture of our social system; similarly, the social organisation, i.e. the party 
organisation, the Communist Youth Organisation, and the trade union, are, 
in addition to the manager, also parts of the structure of the state enterprise. 
This is very important, because it is through these links that the social element, 
socialisation, penetrates into the organisation and function of the economic 
unit. The state enterprise is gradually becoming a state-social organisation in 
this way.
We believe therefore that, standing on the ground of reality of our present, 
but taking into account the trends of development as well, we may essentially 
draw the conclusion that state-public ownership is increasingly transforming 
into all-social joint ownership, and that the social facet of the state enterprise is 
gradually getting stronger. Thus a state enterprise is operating on the basis of a 
legally organised structure created by the state, supplied with separated assets, 
and within the scope of independence granted to it, in order to accomplish 
tasks in the interest of society. It is headed by the manager as the top executive 
organ, having the rights and obligations of one-man leadership, and being 
responsible to the state and the enterprisal collective.
The employees are not simply the subjects of labour relations; on the basis 
of their part-owner status they become members of the enterprise collective; 
on the basis of organisational relations taking shape in this way, and within the 
system of workshop democracy, they take part in the management of enter­
prisal activities, in the discharge of the enterprise’s obligations, according to 
their particular jobs and authority defined by the organisational and functional 
order of the enterprise, and according to their trade union relations.
The structure of the enterprise includes the manager, the trade union, the 
internal bodies functioning under the guidance of the trade union, the produc-
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tion conference, the labour dispute committee, the workshop court; their posi­
tions within the structure, their interrelationships, authority, are determined by 
provisions of law, and — in the spehere mentioned — by trade union statues. 
The state and social character get interwoven within the framework of the 
economic organisation in this way.
Thus the institutions of workshop democracy guarantee that the emplo­
yees, as members of the enterprise collective, can take part — usually through 
the trade union — in the exercise of proprietary and employer’s rights delegated 
to the sphere of authority of the enterprise.
III.
1. I t follows from the ideas we have exposed so far that trade union rights 
and internal social organs functioning within the framework of the enterprise are 
highly important in respect to social ownership and also in respect to proprie­
tary rights to be exercised by the enterprise.
Namely the Hungarian People’s Republic not only guarantees the freedom 
of trade union organisation, but also grants the trade unions a wide scope of 
authority, in accordance with the Constitution. These rights are called ti’ade 
union rights. Aixd pi’ovisions of law obligate state oi’gans and enterprises to 
display a behaviour that respects trade union rights, i.e. to do everything in 
their respective spheres to promote the activities of trade unions, to promote 
the enforcement of trade union rights.
Ti-ade union rights are exercised on various levels, and in various legal 
forms.
Trade union rights are exercised on the national level by the Central 
Council of Hungarian Trade Unions (CCHTU hereinafter),
on the industrial branch level by the various branch trade unions, 
on the enterprisal level by the trade union local organ, by the trade union 
council, by the trade union committee (workshop and department committee, 
trade uxiion group, trade union steward).
The level on which a particular trade union organ must be active to exercise 
certain trade union rights is determined by the statutes of the CCHTU and 
other trade unions within the limits defined by the Code of Labour and the 
Enacting Decree of the Code. Within the compass of one enterprise, these 
questions are often regulated by the collective agreement.
Let us have a closer look at the most important trade union rights: 
a)  Trade unions are entitled to engage in regular activities on the national, 
industrial-branch and enterprisal level within the sphere defined by the Consti­
tution, the Code of Labour, and the trade union statutes. The Code of Labour 
provides that trade unions — as the organisations for representing employees 
andprotecting their interests — shall have the right to engage in regular activiti­
es for impi’oving the financial, social and cultural standards of employees, for 
protecting and enforcing their rights and interests relating to their living and 
working conditions, to draw employees into these activities, and to keep them 
informed of these questions.9 The importance of this right is that no permit is 
required from state oi’gans or enterprises for displaying these activities, that 
nobody is supposed to hinder these activities. Moreover, the Code of Labour
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imposes the obligation of active co-operation on state organs and enterprises 
providing that state organs and enterprises are under the obligation to col­
laborate with trade unions and to promote their activities.10
h) Trade unions have the right to make suggestions on any level for regu­
lations, decisions and measures, to make comments of protesting, amending°or 
supplementing character on existing rules, decisions, measures, etc., in any 
question that affects the living or working conditions of employees. In this 
wide sphere, the suggestions or comments of the trade union have no legally 
binding force on state organs or enterprises. Y et to leave trade union suggestions 
and comments without any legal effect would not be good practice either. Thus 
it is a veiy important new provision of the Code of Labour that the suggestions 
and comments presented by trade unions to state organs and enterprises have 
the legal effect of obligating these organs and enterprises to state their position 
and its reasons.11J his means in practice that even if state organs and enterprises 
are not obliged to comply with trade union comments and suggestions, they 
aie not supposed to put them simply aside, may not leave them unanswered, 
but must study them; and if they disagree, or are not able to carry them through, 
they are obliged to state their views and reasons.
Thus the enterprise, or the manager, is under the obligation to give rea­
sons in case of a rejection of suggestions or comments, i. e. is under the obliga­
tion to consider whether his standpoint would hold. In the second place, rejec­
tion amounts to a deliberate shouldering of political responsibility, of criticism 
and disapproving qualification, and all this moves the manager to exercise 
consideration.
c) Hungarian labour law guarantees trade unions a wide scope of action -  
equivalent to that of the organs of state administration in many a respect — in 
the regulation of the living and working conditions of employees, in order that 
the trade unions should play their part without any restriction, should actually 
be the organisations that protect and represent the interests of the employed 
population. As concerns the regulation of the living and working conditions of 
employees, we must distinguish various levels and types of the right to particip­
ate; these are the rights of making suggestions, comments, of consent, of joint 
regulation and of independent regulation.
aa) It follows from the authority of trade unions presented in paragraph 
c) that they have the right to make suggestions for regulation in any question. 
On the side of the state organ or enterprise the counterpart of the right to 
make suggestions is the obligation to consider the suggestion and to°make 
known the position taken, and its reasons.
bb) In connection with the legislative function of the Council of Ministers, 
Hungarian labour law grants the right of opinion to the CCHTU. The Code of 
Labour provides that the Council of Ministers shall regulate the questions 
connected with the living and working conditions of employees by considering 
the opinion ol the CCHTU. It follows from the nature of the right to opinion 
that the Council of Ministers is only obliged to request the opinion of the CCH- 
TC, there is no legal obstacle to reaching a decision that differs from the opi­
nion of the CCHTU, because the legislative acts of the Council of Ministers, per­
formed on the highest level of state administration, cannot be made conditional 
on the consent of a social organisation. Yet in practice, agreement is reached in 
most cases, even if after a debate; moreover, important decisions affecting the
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living and working conditions of employees are issued by the Council of Minis­
ters and the CCHTU together, in a joint decision,12 especially if the enforcement 
of such a decision requires the co-operation of state and trade union organs.
cc) I t is a general rule allowing of no exception that questions connected 
with the living and working conditions of employees can be regulated by the 
minister only in agreement with the trade union concerned. The consent of the 
trade union organ of the enterprise is required for the validity of any regulation 
of normative character on the enterprisal level.
As concerns the legal form, the regulation is made and issued in such cases 
by the minister or the manager alone; but if the regulation is issued without 
the preliminary consent of the trade union organ concerned, or departs from it, 
the regulation is null and void.
dd) We must make a distinction between the right to consent and the 
right to joint regulation where the state organ or enterprise may issue a regula­
tion only acting in agreement with the trade union. This system is practiced at 
present in connection with the collective agreement which is concluded on the 
part of the enterprise by the manager, and on the part of the employees by 
the trade union.
d) As a consequence of growing enterprisal independence, of enterprisal 
interestedness in profits, the interestedness of the enterprise’s collective is 
growing, too. This is felt in several respects. Novel developmental trends 
emerge, hitherto latent problems i*isc to the surface and call for solution.
Perhaps the most important of these is a developmental process of social 
and psychological nature, which is manifest in the fact that today the employees 
show greater interest in the succesfulness of enterprisal operations. I t follows 
from this that they wish to avail themselves more powerfully of the opportunit­
ies offered by workshop democracy which enables them to take part — through 
the trade union, and within the scope defined by provisions of law — in the plan­
ning, organisation, direction and control of enterprise activities, in the regulation 
of their working conditions, and in the decision of general questions affecting the 
collective. To promote all this, trade unions are increasingly expected to attend 
to their tasks of interest representation and interest protection in the socialist 
sense. These legal possibilities have been created practically by the new Code of 
Labour. Also in these respects the problem presents itself more on the economic- 
social side; how it is possible to create and increase this interestedness and 
interest, to coordinate individual and enterprise interests optimally, in such a 
way tha t the activity of the employees should actually improve enterprise 
operations, and, proportionally, the financial, welfare and cultural standards 
of the employees. The Code reacted to all this by expanding those legal relations 
of collective nature which guarantee for the collective the participation in the 
regulation, management and control of enterprise activities, without, of course, 
impairing the theory and practice of one-man management.
Compared to all this, it is a secondary, but nevertheless important, problem 
that since the introduction of the economic reform clashes of interest are more 
likely to arise between enterprise, enterprisal management and the collective, 
or its groups or members.
Also in this respect the new Code of Labour has started or furthered social 
processes which require novel legal solutions. Consequently it is a very import­
ant problem how to regulate within an enterprise the relationship and the
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spheres of authority between management and the employees’ collective, or the 
trade union representing it. One important requirement and objective of the 
economic reform can be formulated like this: to develop simultancouslv and in 
their interaction one-man managerial authority on the one side, and work­
shop democracy on the other, i.e. to expand the participation of the working 
collective in the improvement and control of enterprise activities, and accord­
ingly to extend the authority of the trade union organ as the representative of 
the collective. In theory, and in an objective manner, there is always a solution 
which is based on common interests; or which, if there is a clash of interests, at 
least optimally reconciles the interests of the enterprise, of the collective and of 
the individual employees. Yet in concrete cases it is not always certain that a 
view or endeavour agreeing with the common interests, or with the harmony of 
interests, will be expressed in the thinking, will and attitude of the carriers and 
representatives of different interests; it may even happen tha t the interests of 
employer and employee cannot be reconciled at all, as for example in cases 
where employment is terminated unilaterally. I t is therefore of special import­
ance that provisions of law should demarcate and regulate the authority of 
the manager, of the trade union, of the collective and of the individual emplo­
yees in a clear-cut manner, they should also regulate the settlement of clashing 
interests, and the legal forms of co-operation for bringing about a harmony of 
interests.
What is of primary importance in this respect is regulation on the enter - 
prisal level, i.e. the collective agreement, and the labour safety regulations of 
the enterprise. Also the provisions in the working order of the enterprise 
which affect the working conditions of the employees may be ranged here. As 
we have shown, the system employed in this sphere creates a relationship of 
co-ordination between the manager acting on behalf of the enterprise, and the 
trade union acting on behalf oi the employees. This is manifest in that the 
enterprise can regulate questions only in agreement with the trade union if 
these relate to working conditions and are subject to regulation by the collective 
agreement, or the labour safety regulations, or by the organisational and func­
tional statutes (working order). Neither party can force its will on the other in 
this respect. All this provides the possibility for the trade union to protect 
the interests of the collective efficiently because with the help of the aforesaid 
forms of regulation it can frame norms that serve the interests of the collective, 
and can prevent the introduction of norms that would violate the interests of 
the collective.
It is not possible, however, to regulate every question in advance, and 
with general validity, by abstract norms, i. e. by means of objective law. There 
may arise problems which must be settled or decided upon in respect to the 
whole collective or its part, or in respect to the individual employee, with 
genera] or specific validity at a time when this becomes necessary; for instance, 
whether reorganisation is necessary, and, if so, who the employees should be to 
whom the enterprise gives notice; or what type of schedule should be introduc­
ed, whether it should be part-time or full-time, uniform or non-uniform system, 
or which employees should work on what schedule if the later is not uniform 
for the whole enterprise.
In accordance with the dissimilar character of these problems, the Code of 
Labour regulates the manager’s authority, the powers of the trade union organ,
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their interrelationships, and the forms of co-operation, in various ways. The 
basic principle observed by the Code of Labour is that in individual cases, or in 
problems that affect only "a minor group of the employees, one-man managerial 
authority should be exercised; accordingly, the Code provides that in such cases 
the manager is authorised to reach a decision without the preliminary agree­
ment of the trade union. But the more a particular problem is likely to affect a 
major group of employees, i.e. the more a problem is of general nature, 
the stronger will be the trade union’s right to participate. The Code of Labour 
distinguishes four groups of cases on this basis:
aa)  The consent of the local trade union organ is required for the settle­
ment of questions of general nature which affect the enterprise as a whole, or its 
major units, relate to employment, but are not regulated in the collective 
contract.13 For example, the question whether a major reduction of the staff is 
necessary can be decided by the manager only in agreement with the trade 
union.
bb) When carrying into effect rules relating to employment, and of deci­
sions in agreement with the trade union pursuant to pragraph aa), -  provided 
that these affect major groups of employees — the opinion of the local trade 
union organ must be asked for.14 This means that rules and general principles, 
framed in the collective contract, as well as decisions reached in agreement with 
the trade union according to paragraph aa), are carried into effectby the manag­
er, and there is no legal obligation on his part to secure the trade union’s co­
operation for these measures. If, however, the implementation affects major 
groups of employees, he is under the obligation to consider the trade union’s 
opinion before taking these steps.
cc) If the implementation of rules relating to employment, or of decisions 
reached in agreement with the trade union according to paragraph aa), only 
affect individual employees or minor groups of employees, the trade union’s 
consent is not required, and, moreover the manager is not even legally obliged 
to ask the trade union’s opinion. For instance, trade union agreement is not 
necessary for deciding on a minor reduction of staff; nor is the trade union s 
opinion to be asked for in the matter of whom the enterprise should give notice 
in such a case.
cUl) The local organ of the trade union takes independent decisions on the 
manner of spending social and cultural funds, but is under the obligation to 
consider the enterprise’s opinion before reaching such decisions.15
A number of problems can arise in practice in connection with the grouping 
we have described. In concrete cases, for instance, it might become doubtful 
whether the problem to be settled affects the enterprise as a whole or its major 
units. It may become problematic in concrete cases whether the implementa­
tion of decisions reached in agreement with the trade union affects a major 
group of employees. In general terms, one only can start from the principle that 
the question of delimitation must be resolved with due consideration of the 
given case.
e) We are confronted with one of the strongest types of trade union rights 
when the trade union labour inspector can reach a decision independently 
which is binding on the enterprise, the manager, with the same effect as a deci­
sion of the supervisory organ. Obviously, the possibility of such a measure is 
kept within narrow limits, in the field of labour safety. Under the law, trade
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unions have the right to “take measures” directly whenever the carrying into 
effect of labour safety regulations is neglected, and these decisions are legally 
binding on the enterprise, the manager.
/ )  One of the trade unions’ very important tasks of interest protection is 
to promote the observance by various state organs and enterprises of the rules 
relating to the living and working conditions of employees. As appears also from 
what we have said, the independence of the enterprises has grown since the 
introduction of the economic reform, and one-man managerial authority has 
increased accordingly. In view of this fact, the Code of Labour has extended 
the possibilities for trade unions to attend to their tasks of interest protection. 
For this purpose the Code has vested the trade unions with important rights, 
namely the right of inspection, the right of summons, and the right to initiate 
proceedings.
aa) The unimpaired exercise of the trade unions’ right of inspection is 
served by the rule according to which the trade union has the right to supervise 
the observance of the regulations relating to the living and working conditions 
of employees. Within this scope they are authorised to request information 
from the organs concerned on the implementation of regulations relating to 
employment, and are authorised to hold investigations at enterprises. Enter­
prises are under the obligation to supply information necessary for such investi­
gation, and to make available the necessary data.16
bb) Inspection in itself contributes greatly to the observance of provisions 
of law. Yet it would not be sufficient if the trade union’s authority only com­
prised the right of inspection. In view of this, the law provides that the trade 
unions can call the attention of the organs responsible for implementation to 
the deficiencies and neglects found during inspection; and if these organs fail 
to take the necessary measures in due time, the trade union may initiate pro­
ceedings as required by the case. The organ conducting such proceedings is 
under the obligation to inform the trade union of the outcome.17
On the basis of this provision, for example, the trade union can — in the 
employee’s interest, in his name and on his behalf, with or even without the 
employee’s authorisation — file a complaint with the committee of labour 
disputes. In serious cases the trade union can suggest to take disciplinary ac­
tion against the person who had committed the fault or neglect delinquents. 
If the fault or neglect constitutes an offence or a criminal act, the trade union 
may initiate criminal procedure. In cases defined by law the trade union can 
initiate proceedings before the workshop court.
q) The right to object is a novel and powerful legal means granted to 
trade unions. The law provides that the local trade union organ shall have the 
right to object to any measure of the enterprise if it violates the rules relating to 
employment, or is not in conformity with treatment as required by socialist 
morals.18
Objection is in several respects a more powerful means than the complaints 
employees can file with the labour dispute committee. Here we only point out 
that the employee’s complaint has no delaying force on the implementation of 
the measure regarded as injurious, unless otherwise provided by law.19 By 
contrast, once the trade union has exercised its right to object, the measure may 
not be carried into effect until the decision of the proper organ.20
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Provisions of law also define the sphere within which the right to object is 
due to the local trade union organ. The Code of Labour distinguishes two 
groups of cases:
The first group includes the cases in which the measure of the employer 
enterprise has violated rules relating to employment. Hence any measure can 
be objected to if it violates personal, subjective rights of one or more employees, 
or violates rights of collective character. For example, the trade union can raise 
objection if t he enterprise dismounts a safety device of general use which serves 
the protection not of one specified employee, but of — say — an entire depart­
ment of the works; or it may raise objection if the enterprise had taken steps 
without the consent of the trade union, although it ought to have obtained it, 
because the measure in question affects the whole of the enterprise, or its major 
unit, or relates to employment in general, but had not been regulated in the 
collective contract. Objection may be raised also in cases when some measure is 
contrary to the “general provisions” of the Code of Labour, for example, if the 
measure of the enterprise fails to i-ealise the harmony of social and individual 
interests although the objective conditions to do so are given; or if the measure 
does not meet the social purpose of the right on which it is based, or even con­
stitutes abuse of rights.
The second group of measures that can be contested by objection comprises 
cases in which the measure is contrary to treatment as required by socialist 
morals. This rule is of extreme importance. Namely it means — in both theory 
and practice — that the trade union can raise objection not only if the measure 
in question violates a provision of law, i. e. rights of individual or collective 
character, but can do so also beyond this sphere. Yet social morals involve a 
number of requirements, and that all these cannot be enumerated in provisions 
of law is obvious. What serves therefore as principal guidance in this respect is 
the principles of labour law defined in the Constitution. We emphasize this 
particularly because of the fact that these principles are characterised in a cer- 
rain sphere, in certain aspects, by the very circumstance that their requirements 
cannot be formulated in every case in the form of subjective rights of individual 
or collective character. Thus the right to object assumes special significance by 
the possibility that the trade union can raise objection also in cases where no 
explicit violation of rights has occurred, but the manner of treatment is cont­
rary to the basic principles of labour law which also define the most important 
precepts of socialist morals in the field of labour law.
Yet the right to object cannot be restricted to cases where basic principles 
are violated; objection may be raised in any case -where the connexion with the 
law does not exist even to such an extent , but the contradiction between socialist 
morals and the measure in question is of such extent that it constitutes a viola­
tion of the rules of treatment according to socialist morals; a manner of treat­
ment, for example, that insults the human dignity, self-esteem or the morals of 
employees.
The term “measure” must be interpreted in the widest sense; thus the term 
applies to any decision, order, instruction which in any way affects the position 
of the collective, or the individual employee within the enterprise.
Objections are submitted by the local trade union organ to the enterprise. 
If the enterprise does not agree with the objection, it is obliged to submit it —
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with its opinion attached — for decision within three days, and to forward a 
copy of its opinion to the local trade union organ at the same time.21
As concerns the further procedure, the law makes distinctions depending 
on how broad a circle of employees is affected by the measure objected to:
aa) If the measure objected to affects tlm whole collective of the enter­
prise, or a group of employees, the objection must be judged by the supervisory 
organ of the enterprise and by the superior organ of the trade union.22 If the 
supervisory organ of the enterprise and the trade union organ of higher level 
decide in agreement that the objection is not founded, they reject it, and the 
measure in question can be carried out. If, however, they decide that the ob­
jection is well-founded, this decision is binding on the enterprise, which means 
that the measure may not be carried into effect; and if implementation has 
taken place already, the enterprise is under the obligation to restore the original 
state.
hb) If the measure objected to relates to an individual case, it is decided by 
the labour dispute committee in a procedure prescribed for such disputes, 
with the difference, however, that the case comes under the jurisdiction of thé 
regional labour dispute committee right away, and is not dealt with by the 
committee on the enterprise level.23
As we have seen, the institution of objection offers the possibility to prevent 
infringement of lawful rights of both individual and collective nature, even to 
prevent interference with individual and collective interests through a manner 
of treatment that is contrary to socialist morals; and it provides the possibility 
to settle disputes of this nature.
h) The possibilities available to employees for enforcing their rights, the 
organs settling disputes, and the manner of settling them, are essential ques­
tions in any branch of law, but especially in the field of labour law. One impor­
tant manifestation of workshop democracy is the circumstance that the trade 
unions participate in the institution and work of committees that settle labour 
disputes, and can exert their influence on decisions in labour disputes in this 
way.
i) To make the protection of employees’ interests efficient, the Code of 
Labour has vested the trade unions with very wide powers of representation. 
The law provides that trade unions can represent employees in court before other 
authorities and bodies, in questions that bear on the living and working condi­
tions of employed persons. In questions affecting service relations, the trade 
union can act in the interest of the employee — in his name and on his behalf -  
even without the employee’s special authorisation to do so.24
Thus the trade union is the organ for protecting the employees’ interests 
ex lege. In this connection we may draw a distinction between general and 
individual interest protection.
YY hen the trade union takes part in the regulation and decision of questions 
affecting the employees’ living conditions, when it promotes the observance of 
the law, etc. it acts on its authority of general interest protection and represen­
tation, representing the collective of the enterprise.
We speak of individual interest protection when the trade union act on 
behalf of the individual employee. The power of representation is due to the 
trade union ex lege also in this respect, which means that the trade union can 
act without the express authorization or request of the employee, can turn to
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the labour dispute committee, can resort to a legal remedy against a disciplinary 
decision, against a decision for damages, a decision of the labour dispute com­
mittee, etc., i. e. can avail itself of all means of enforcement and legal remedies 
which are due to the employee.
j j  Trade union officials may get into contradiction with the manager of the 
enterprise while attending to their tasks. Adequate legal protection must there­
fore be afforded them, lest they should be exposed to retaliation. Care had to be 
taken, too, to prevent abrupt changes, as a result of which certain trade union 
functions would be attended to by nobody. The Code of Labour contains seve­
ral provisions in this respect:25
na) The consent of the immediate superior trade union organ is required 
in case of an elected trade union official:
for assigning him to another post;
for the discontinuance of his employment by the the employer enterprise 
through giving notice, or through disciplinary dismissal;
for fixing the time of taking up his new post in case of transfer.
bb) The superior trade union organ must be notified in advance if an 
elected trade union official, employed at a changing place of work, is assigned to 
another post.
In cases enumerated in paragraph aa), the measure taken by the enterprise 
is null and void if the consent of the superior trade union organ has not been 
obtained.
In cases coming under paragraph bb), the employer enterprise is not under 
the obligation of notification, hence the failure to give notification does not 
result in the invalidity of the measure.
2. The full development of workshop democracy is served by the highly 
important institution whereby the state makes possible the setting up of inter­
nal bodies in enterprises to attend to specific tasks with the co-operation of the 
employees, and usually under the guidance of the trade union; the participation 
of the employees in the planning, organisation, direction and control of enter­
prise work is promoted in this way. These organs and institutions of workshop 
democracy are the following: production conferences, organisation of social 
labour safety inspection, committee of labour disputes, workshop court, social 
security council, and committee of disability cases.26
a j  Production conferences are an important institution of workshop 
democracy. Their purpose is to make possible the direct participation of the 
members of the collective in the planning, organisation, direction and control of 
production.
In the field of production, communications and trade, in the field of eco­
nomic activities in short, production conferences must be held quarterly at 
least, and by small production units within the framework of the enterprise. A 
production conference must be convened whenever this is requested by the 
majority of the employees concerned, by the trade union organs, or is considered 
necessary by the economic or technological leaders.
The duty of the production conference is to discuss the most important 
tasks of the enterprise, or of the production unit, as a result of the discussion to 
shape the best methods for accomplishing the tasks, to reach decisions on 
competitive pledges and their most expedient forms. Another duty of the 
production conference is to evaluate the work of management and of the collec-
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tive performed in the past period, to evaluate the fulfilment of tasks, the reali­
sation of competitive pledges; to pass judgment and to make suggestions on this 
basis for improving the work of the collective; and to express aprreciation of 
successful work.
The production conference has authority to give expert opinion, to make 
suggestions and to reach decisions for the realisation of tasks described above;
aa) in the spehere of economic activities and management, the production 
conference’s authority is usually restricted to giving opinion and making 
suggestions;
bb) the production conference has authority to decide three types of 
question, viz. acceptance of competitive pledges, employment of forms of 
competition that best meet local conditions, and awarding the distinction 
“Eminent Worker” and the title “Socialist Brigade”.
Preparation and holding of the production conference is the joint responsi­
bility of the economic manager in charge of the unit and the trade union; the 
report is to be made by the economic manager.
To keep a record of the comments and suggestions made at the conference, 
to realise appropriate suggestions, is the responsibility of the economic mana­
ger. For this purpose he must take action in the matter of comments and sug­
gestions, notify the employees within 15 days of the wiews taken of these, and 
must submit a report of the steps taken to the next production conference. The 
enterprise manager and the supervisory organ are obliged, and the trade union 
has the right, to supervise all this. If the economic managers fail to meet these 
obligations, the trade union may initiate disciplinary action with the superior 
organ.
In the technological, administrative and other divisions of economic 
units, as well as institutions and offices, not production conferences but work- 
meetings must be held; the rules described above apply to these, with differen­
ces as required.
b) One very important manifestation of workshop democracy and of the 
participation rights of the collective is that within enterprise the function of 
labour safety inspection is performed besides the trade union labour inspectors 
by voluntary inspectors who are employees of the enterprise. Although in a 
narrower field than the trade union inspectors, voluntary inspectors have 
authority not only of inspection, but also of taking measures directly, giving 
instructions that are binding on the enterprise, in order to ensure the observance 
of labour safety regulations.
c) Disputes connected with the rights and obligations of employment, and 
arising between employee and the employer enterprise, are dealt with in the 
first instance — except the disputes of employees in higher leading positions — 
by committees organised within the enterprise. Their decisions have the same 
binding force as decisions passed by courts of first instance. These labour dis­
pute committees are made up of the employees of the enterprise. This means 
that labour disputes, at least, in the first instance are settled by the employees 
themselves. This right to participate is also an important manifestation of 
workshop democracy.
cl) Important interests of the enterprise collective are involved in ensu­
ring that disciplined work should be done in the enterprise, that social property 
should be protected and increased, and that the requirements of socialist co­
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operation and mutual help should he met. To promote all this, several sanctions 
are available to the enterprise, even disciplinary sanctions in serious cases. To 
exercise disciplinary authority is the right of the manager in the first place, and 
of the employees in leading positions to whom the manager delegates this right. 
Yet it follows from the nature of a socialist enterprise, and — accordingly — 
from the development of workshop democracy, that Hungarian labour law 
grants the right of praticipation also to the employees’ collective, to enable 
them to promote the realisation of the aforeasaid requirements in their own 
intei’est. This purpose is served — among others — by the institution of work- 
shopcourts. A workshop court is the elected body, of the employees; its duty is to 
educate the employees to do conscious, disciplined work, to protect social 
property; and to promote mutual respect for the employees’ human dignity, 
property and rights. In order to accomplish all this, the workshop court can 
employ various measures of educative effect, even milder legal sanctions, within 
a sphere defined by provisions of law. Employees can be admonished or censu­
red. The court may rule that an employee should not get rewards for one year at 
most. The court may withdraw part (not more than half) of the profit share, or 
reward of this nature, payable to next time. The court can recommend to the 
manager to transfer an employee to some other post by disciplinary action, 
or to dismiss him summarily.
e) At enterprises where the employees receive the social security services 
and family allowances at what is called works payment-offices, social security 
councils must be set up from among the employees. Such councils are organised 
by the local trade union organs; their duty is to assists and supervise social 
security administration, and to attend to social security tasks assigned to them. 
In addition these councils act as bodies of legal remedy of first instance in cases 
when employees file a complaint in connection with sick insurance and family 
allowance services.
/ )  To keep a check on the conditions of employees with a reduced capacity 
for work, and to promote their rehabilitation, enterprise committees must be 
set up. Upon an initiative of the employee or the enterprise, the committees 
make recommendations, according to which the manager is obliged to take 
proper measures for rehabilitation.
3. It may happen that the manager, or employees in leading positions, do 
not rely on the community of employees in defiance of legal provisions relating 
to state enterprises; that they do not respect the trade union’s rights of interest 
protection and representation; that they do not meet their obligation to co­
operate with the trade unions as provided by law; moreover, that they decidedly 
break their obligations towards the collective or the trade union. It is therefore 
noteworthy in this connection that the legal rules on state enterprises provide 
for an evaluation of the activities of managers and their deputies, to be made 
by the supervisory organ once a year at least. Such evaluation is affected most 
adversely if the manager or his deputies had broken their aforesaid obligations 
repeatedly or gravely, as a consequence it may happen that the supervisory 
organ — which exercises the employer’s rights towards them — reduces or 
withdraws their premium, imposes disciplinary sanctions and in extreme cases 
— discontinues their employment by giving notice, even with immediate 
effect. All this can be recommended also by the trade union explicitely; in such 
cases — as we have set forth in paragraph 2 — the head of the supervisory organ
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is under the obligation to consider the recommendation, and if he disagrees 
with it, he must give his reasons. The same applies to cases where the trade 
union makes such recommendation to the manager in respect to an employee in 
a leading position.
IV.
From this roughly outlined description of the institutions of workshop 
democracy and trade union rights it is evident that powerful rights are due in a 
very broad field to enterprise collectives and to the trade unions representing 
them. But it is just as evident that the necessity to ensure the one-man manage­
ment system draws the limits, equally discussed above, beyond which such 
rights cannot go.
I t is obvious, on the one hand, that, especially within the sphere of enter- 
prisal economic activities, it is the manager who reaches decisions in the last 
instance, acting on lois one-man managerial authority, and within the scope 
defined by provisions of law, i.e. by taking into account also the limits set by the 
rules of workshop democracy presented in the foregoing. On the other hand, 
the enterprise collective, its members, or the trade union acting on their behalf, 
and on the basis of rights due to them, participate in enterprise activities 
directly or indirectly, and exert influence on the ways in which the enterprise 
exercises the proprietary and employer’s rights delegated to it.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
H insichtlich der Analyse des w irtschaftlich-sozialen Inhaltes des gesellschaftlichen Eigen­
tum s und  der E igentüm errechte, die von den sozialistischen W irtschaftsorganisationen ausgeübt 
werden können, sowie bezüglich der A usgestaltung ihrer Organisations- und R eehtsfoiinen ist 
die staatsrechtliche, verw altungsrechtliche, finanzrechtliche und zivilrechtliche A nnäherung 
an  diese Fragen eine sehr wesentliche wissenschaftliche Aufgabe. Eine m indestens so wichtige 
Frage ist, aber, wie die W erktätigenkollektive der U nternehm en unm itte lbar oder durch V er­
m ittlung der G ewerkschaften oder anderer gesellschaftlicher Organe an der A usübung der E igen­
tüm errechte teilnehm en können, die den U nternehm en übertragen  worden sind. Zu diesem Zweck 
ist zu analysieren bzw. entsprechend zu regeln, über was für M itw irkungsrechte, die W erktätigen­
kollektive au f U ntem ehm ensebene und teils auch au f höherem N iveau — u n ter A ufrechterhaltung 
des Prinzips der E inm annleitung — bei der P lanung und  O rganisation, bei der Leitung und K on­
trolle der T ätigkeit der U nternehm en, weiters bei der Regelung, Organisierung und Entw icklung 
ihrer Lebens- und A rbeitsverhältnisse usw. verfügen sollen. E s is t auch eine wichtige Frage, 
wie und  u n te r Anwendung welcher Rechtsform en sich die U ntem ehm enskollektive und ihre 
Mitglieder — durch V erm ittlung der U nternehm en — am  N ationaleinkom m en, bzw. am  Gewinn 
des U nternehm ens beteiligen.
Zwecks K lärung all dieser Fragen übernim m t die W issenschaft des A rbeitsrechtes sozu­
sagen am  T or des U nternehm ens die Staffel vom S taatsrech t, Verwaltungs- und F inanzrecht 
sowie vom Zivilrecht und un tersuch t in ers ter Reihe, wie sich das innere w irtschaftlich-soziale 
Substra t des sozialistischen U nternehm ens und die dem entsprechende U nternehm ensstruktur, 
die organisationsrechtliche Stellung des K ollektivs und seiner Mitglieder gestalten.
A ufgrund der ü bers ieh t der E inrichtungen der B etriebsdem okratie und  der G ewerkschafts­
rechte kann festgestellt werden, dass dem  U nternehm enskollektiv  und seinem V ertreter, der 
Gewerkschaft, au f einem sehr weiten Gebiet rech t bedeutende R echte zukommen. Andererseits
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ist es aber klar, dass die N otw endigkeit der G ewährleistung der E inm annleitung  jene ebenfalls 
erö rterten  Grenzen bestim m t, die durch diese R echte n ich t m ehr überschritten  w erden können.
So is t es z.B. einerseits offensichtlich, dass insbesondere au f  dem  Gebiet der W irtschafts­
tä tigkeit des U nternehm ens undzw ar im  R ahm en der R echtsvorschriften , d.h. u n te r B eachtung 
der schon erw ähnten Regeln der B etriebsdem okratie le tz ten  E ndes der D irektor als E inzelleiter 
seine E ntscheidung trifft. Andt rerseits arbeiten  aber das U nternehm enskollektiv , seine M it­
glieder bzw. die in seiner V ertretung vorgehende G ew erkschaft aufgrund der ihnen zukom m en­
den R echte  unm itte lbar oder m itte lbar daran  m it, bzw. nehm en E influss darauf, wie das U n te r­
nehm en die ihm übertragenen U nternehm er- und A rbeitsgeberrechte ausübt.
РЕЗЮМЕ
С точки зрения анализа экономическо-общественного содержания собственнических 
правомочий, осуществляемых общественной собственностью и социалистическими х о з я й ­
с т в у ю щ и м и  организациями и с точки зрения формирования организационно-правовых 
форм, существенной научной задачей является государственно-правовой, административ­
ный, финансовый и гражданско-правовой подход к этим вопросам.
Не менее важным вопросом является, каким образом .м о г у т  коллективы рабочих па 
предприятиях принимать участие непосредственно или же через посредство профсоюзов 
и иных общественных органов в осуществлении собственнических правомочий, предоста­
вленных предприятиям. В интересах этого нужно анализировать, вернее соответствую­
щим образом регулировать то, -  соблюдая принцип единоличного управления -  каким 
правомочием должны обладать коллективы рабочих, чтобы на уровне предприятий и в 
частности на высшем уровне содействовать в планировании, и организации, управлении 
и контроле, далее в регулировании и устройстве, в развитии и д. предприятий.
Важным вопросом является и то, как и при помощи каких правовых форм коллек­
тивы предприятий и их члены — через посредство предприятий — получают из националь­
ного дохода, вернее, каким образом участвуют в прибыли предприятий.
В интересе выяснения всех этих вопросов наука трудового права, как будто у ворот 
предприятия, принимает эстафетную палочку от государственного права, административ­
ного права, финансового и гражданского права, и главным образом исследует, как фор­
мируется внутренний хозяйственно-общественный субстрат социалистического пред­
приятия и соответствующая этому структура предприятия, организационное положение 
коллектива и его членов с точки зрения вышеупомянутых вопросов.
На основе и н с т и т у т о в  заводской демократии и схематического изложения профсоюз­
ных правомочий .можно установить, что заводскому коллективу и его иредставителю- 
профсоюзу принадлежат большие правомочия. С другой же стороны ясно, что необходи­
мость обеспечения единоличного управления определяет те намеченные рамки, выше 
которых эти правомочия уже не .м о г у т  распространяться.
'Гак, например, с одной стороны ясно, что по высшей инстанции директор решает в 
правовой сфере единоличного управления, особенно в отношении хозяйственной деятель­
ности предприятия, а именно в рамках правовых норм, т. е. принимая во внимание рамки, 
определенные вышеуказанными нормами заводской демократии. А с другой стороны кол­
лектив предприятия, его члены, вернее в качестве их представителя профсоюз, на основе 
принадлежащих им правомочий непосредственно или косвенно, но содействуют, влияют 
на то, каким образо.м предприятие осуществляет возложенные на него собственнические 
и занимательские правомочия.
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